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Transnational Fiduciary Law in Financial
Intermediation: Are We There Yet?
A Case Study in the Emergence of
Transnational Legal Ordering
Jens-Hinrich Binder*
At first sight, the emergence of globally accepted conduct-of-business standards for securities
intermediaries, driven by international standard-setting bodies, presents itself as a showcase for
successful transnational legal ordering. For some time now, such standards have come to address
issues that traditionally would be addressed by fiduciary law in common law jurisdictions. Within
the European Union, the relevant standards have been transposed into legislation binding on all
EU Member States, irrespective of their legal environment. While clearly originating from common
law principles governing fiduciary relationships, the standards thus have trickled into civil law
systems, turning them into a useful object of study from the perspective of transnational law theory.
Against this backdrop, the present Article explores the emanation, development, transnational
dissemination, and reception of conduct-of-business standards from a European and German law
perspective and looks at enforcement problems in both administrative and contract law. It
demonstrates that, while the relevant law can be characterized as reflecting an emerging
transnational legal order, differences between legal systems continue to exist and the process of
transnationalization is far from over.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In both common and civil law jurisdictions, fiduciary duties, in the broadest
sense, have long been recognized as a key element of the relationships between
financial intermediaries and their customers. If one defines fiduciary relationships
as including “important social and economic interactions of high trust and
confidence that create an implicit dependency and peculiar vulnerability of the
beneficiary to the fiduciary,” to borrow a definition suggested by Leonard Rotman,1
a broad range of financial services clearly match the description.2 From a
comparative––and, particularly, from a Trans-Atlantic perspective––a useful
starting point for the analysis can be found in the statutory definitions of financial
activities subject to specific prudential and conduct-of-business regulations.
Wherever intermediaries hold money or other assets on behalf of clients in
connection with transactions carried out on their behalf3 or agree to provide expert

1.
Leonard I. Rotman, Understanding Fiduciary Duties and Relationship Fiduciarity, 62 MCGILL L.J.
975, 988 (2017).
2.
It should be noted that this definition, although firmly rooted in common law doctrine, is
generic in nature. At least English cases traditionally have determined the existence of fiduciary duties
by reference to the status of the relevant relationships (trustee-beneficiary, solicitor client, agentprincipal, director-company, partner-partner), while only a smaller number of cases have adopted a
functional definition, see, within the present context, The Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties and
Regulatory Rules, Consultation Paper No. 124, (London: HMSO 1992) ¶¶ 2.4.3-2.4.7. For an example
of the latter, which is broadly consistent with the definition advanced above, see, e.g., Reading v.
Attorney-General [1949] 2 K.B. 232, 236, approved on appeal [1951] A.C. 507 (di cussed in Law
Commission, ibid., para. 2.4.5):
(“[T]he term ‘fiduciary relation’ . . . is used in a very loose, or at all events a very
comprehensive, sense . . . [F]or the present purpose a ‘fiduciary relation’ exists (a)
whenever the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant property . . . and (b) whenever
the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant a job to be performed . . . and relies on the
defendant to procure for the plaintiff the best terms available. . .”).
3.
Qualifying as an “ancillary service” in relation to the provision of “investment services.“
European Parliament Directive 2014/65, 2014 O.J. (L173) 349, 481 [hereinafter MiFID II]. In U.S. law,
by contrast, the Securities Exchange Act applies a rather broad concept to define a “broker” as “any
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advice with regard to investments4 or the conditions of a loan taken out by a
customer,5 the existence of both a high level of trust and a high level of dependency
and vulnerability on the part of the client is not just a characteristic feature of the
intermediary-customer relationship, but provides the very rationale for public
intervention, particularly in the form of conduct-of-business regulation. From a
common law perspective, such activities will usually be qualified as agency
relationships, which, given the functional nexus between fiduciary law and the law
of agency in common law generally,6 helps explain why financial intermediaries have
frequently been held to be under fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, as well as duties
to disclose certain information, to their customers.7 This analysis can be backed up
by an economic analysis of the agency problems between the intermediary (acting
as “agent” for less knowledgeable investors) and the customer (as a “principal,”
who, almost by definition, can hardly protect himself against the fallout from
information asymmetries and conflicts of interest on the part of the former).8
However, even in civil law jurisdictions, where the legal basis for financial services
contracts usually consists of, or is derived from, statutory categories of general
contract law,9 the concept of fiduciary duties has increasingly come to be accepted

person engaged in the business of effecting transactions for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012).
4. Qualifying as an “investment service” pursuant to MiFID II Annex I, Section A no. (5) in
conjunction with Art. 4(1)(2). In U.S. law, the provision of investment advisers is addressed by the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-20 (2019).
5.
Unlike investment advice, the provision of advice with regard to the conditions (and/or
uses) of a loan to a borrower is not universally regulated as a financial service and thus does not give
rise to specific regulatory duties on the part of an intermediary, but may nonetheless held to be subject
to special duties of care under fiduciary law or general principles of contract law. Cf., e.g., Andrew F.
Tuch, Fiduciary Principles in Banking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, ch. 7, at 128
(Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff, eds., 2019) (discussing U.S. case law); Jens-Hinrich
Binder, Germany, in A BANK’S DUTY OF CARE 61, at 63–65 (Danny Busch & Cees Van Dam, eds., 2017)
(discussing the legal basis in German law and relevant cases).
6.
E.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 23 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). See also Howell E. Jackson & Talia B. Gillis,
Fiduciary Law and Financial Regulation, supra at 856. Cf., Marme Inversiones 2007 SL v. NatWest Markets
PLC and Others [2019] EWHC 366 (Comm) (QB) 408–17, for an in-depth analysis of the doctrinal
link between the two concepts from an English law perspective.
7.
See also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 632–39 (7th ed.
2017); Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1279–
83 (1983); cf., Tuch, supra note 5 (comprehensively analysing U.S. case law in relation to commercial and
investment banking activities); Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Principles in Investment Advice, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, ch. 8 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) (comprehensively analysing
U.S. Case law in relation to the provision of investment advice). English courts have also recognized
the fiduciary nature of broker services, cf., e.g., Brandeis (Brokers) Ltd v Herbert Black 2001 WL 513189
(QB), paras. 49, 52.
8.
See also Langevoort, supra note 7, at 1249–50, 1252–58 (discussing the economic aspects of
securities frauds in the light of the principal-agent relationship between broker and investor); cf. D.
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1432 (2002) (noting
the applicability and limits of the principal-agent theory in relation to fiduciary relationships).
9.
Cf., e.g., the position of German law infra Section III.C.
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as an analytical framework.10 For a number of reasons to be explored in more detail
below, both the substantive laws pertaining to the provision of financial services
and, indeed, their doctrinal interpretation can be seen to have converged in a large
number of jurisdictions over the last few decades.
With international standard setters, in particular the International
Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), as a driving force behind these
developments,11 the emergence of an increasing body of internationally agreed set
of standards applicable to intermediary-customer relationships in financial services
appears to represent a showcase for transnational legal ordering, in terms of the
causes of convergence, the underlying institutional arrangements that facilitate the
transmission process, as well as the substance of such duties and their adaptation in
different legal systems. On closer inspection, however, the picture is more nuanced.
As rightly observed in a recent contribution by Howell Jackson and Talia Gillis, we
have to distinguish between the regulatory regimes applicable to the provision of
financial services, “elaborate set[s] of ex ante requirements[,] and supplemental openended duties that govern the operations of regulated entities and police their
interactions with the public,” on the one hand, and parallel, overlapping, or indeed
conflicting fiduciary duties proper, which are derived from general principles of
private law and imposed ex post by courts in individual law suits.12 As will be
discussed below, while the structure and content of regulatory regimes have been
converging over the past decades, the relevant fiduciary principles, in terms of
substance, interpretation, and, indeed, their functions within the respective private
law regimes, continue to vary among different jurisdictions. This is certainly true
within the European Union, where EU law has gone some way to harmonize the
regulatory framework, whereas the applicable private law remains to be defined by
the laws of the Member States, many of which had established transactions-oriented
principles long before the first harmonization efforts at the European level.13
However, in addition to the international harmonization of regulatory conduct-ofbusiness standards, their interaction with the applicable private law regimes can also
be identified as a common theme: whether, and to what extent, principles of general
contract law are influenced by regulatory requirements and which of the two
regimes prevails in cases of conflicting duties. Such questions will ultimately
influence which duties can be enforced by customers in private lawsuits against the
10. See Binder, supra note 5 (combining both civil and common law analyses of various types of
commercial and investment banking activities); see also Thilo Kuntz, Das Recht der Interessenwahrung
Verhältnisse und Perspektiven von Fiduciary Law in Deutschland, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARSTEN SCHMIDT
ZUM 80. GEBURTSTAG 761, 773–80 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2019) (Ger.), for an analysis of
the relevance of fiduciary duties in the areas of investment advice and corporate law.
11. See infra Section III.C.
12. See Jackson & Gillis, supra note 6, at 851, 853, for early, but very comprehensive analyses
of the interplay between both regimes (from an English law perspective). Compare The Law
Commission, supra note 2 with THE LAW COMMISSION, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND REGULATORY
RULES, 1995 Law Com. No. 236 (UK).
13.
Infra Section III.C.
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intermediary. The answers may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending
on the doctrinal basis. Yet the very fact that regulatory requirements and duties
under general contract law coexist and that the potential for tensions between the
two regimes clearly is a recurring phenomenon provides sufficient grounds for the
hypothesis that, in the end, fiduciary activities by financial intermediaries are the
object of an emerging transnational legal order.
Focusing on conduct-of-business standards for securities services providers,14
the present Article explores the emergence of a transnational body of fiduciary
duties of financial intermediaries. Section II below examines the interaction between
regulatory requirements and fiduciary principles and explains the transnational
character of the former. Section III then looks into the process of how transnational
regulatory principles have been adapted by European legislation, which in turn has
also triggered a process of convergence of the underlying contract law regimes. In
this process, it will be argued, substantive and organizational duties of care and
loyalty have changed their nature: principles derived from the common law doctrine
of fiduciary law are adapted to different contract law regimes, while retaining their
functions and meaning for the individual customer. As demonstrated by ongoing
disputes concerning the relevance of regulatory duties for individual contractual
relationships in several European jurisdictions, this process is by no means
frictionless––but it is, for that very reason, an interesting case study in the
emergence of a transnational legal order. Section IV concludes.
II. FIDUCIARY LAW IN FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION:
A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?!
A. Conduct-of-business standards as transnational law: origins, nature, and legitimacy
The modern development towards converging conduct-of-business standards
for the provision of financial services (and, thus, towards standards for the regulatory
treatment of relationships that qualify as “fiduciary” within the meaning defined
above) can be traced back, at least, to the late 1980s and early 1990s.15 Following
preparatory work, in particular, by the French Commission des Opérations de
Bourse (COB), which had published a report of self-regulatory principles for the
provision of securities services in 1988,16 the International Organization of
14. To be sure, similar observations can be made also in other areas of financial intermediation.
Arguably, though, securities intermediation is a particularly well-placed object of study for present
purposes, given the high degree of convergence of applicable conduct-of-business standards in this
regard, especially by comparison with retail banking activities the regulation of which, at least in the
EU, has not attracted the attention of the legislator to a similar extent.
15. It is, therefore, imprecise to attribute IOSCO’s work only to a later stage of international
standard setting in financial regulation, but see Eric Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators: The Emergence and
Limits of the Transnational Financial Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 231, at 238
(Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds., 2015) (referring to later work products).
16.
Cf. Commission des Opérations de Bourse (C.O.B.), Rapport Général du Groupe de
Déontologie des Activités Financières (C.O.B. Supplément au Bulletin Mensuel no. 212, mars 1988),
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Securities Commissions (IOSCO) promulgated a set of genuinely international,
rather high-level and basic, conduct-of-business standards, entitled “International
Conduct of Business Principles,”17 in July 1990.18 With this “soft law” document,
IOSCO made a first step towards the global recognition of conduct-of-business
regulation as an integral part of securities regulation generally, implemented and
enforced in the interest of customer protection and market integrity and distinct
from market conduct regulation (e.g., relating to insider trading and market abuse)
on the one hand and the prudential regulation of intermediaries’ capital and liquidity
positions on the other hand.19 The need for global convergence of such standards,
in the report, is justified against the backdrop of the internationalization of securities
markets since the 1970s, driven by technological progress but also the
institutionalization of portfolio management in the widest sense, whereby not just
issuers’ and intermediaries’, but also investors’ activities extended increasingly
beyond national boundaries.20 Significantly, in this context, global harmonization of
conduct-of-business standards is argued to be in the interest of market participants
themselves, as universally applicable common principles “should facilitate cross
border business, encouraging competition among firms, with increased customer
choice and lower costs. Commonly agreed principles should also enhance investor
understanding, and hence confidence, thereby increasing investor participation in
international markets.”21 Conduct-of-business principles, in the report, were
defined “as those principles of conduct which govern the activities of those who
provide financial services and which have the objective of protecting the interests
of their customers and the integrity of the market.”22
To that end, the “principles” established, in particular, the following duties of
an investment firm:23
to “act honestly and fairly in the best interest of its customers and the integrity
of the market” (which expressly included “any obligation to avoid misleading and
deceptive acts or representations”);
to “act with due skill, care and diligence in the best interest of its customers
and the integrity of the market” (which expressly included “any duty of best
execution”);
to provide for and effectively employ the necessary resources;
https://www.amf-france.org/technique/multimedia?docId=workspace://SpacesStore/e253b577a2a5-47f3-9768-e66c72d59514_fr_1.0_rendition.
17.
The Technical Committee of the Int’l Org. of Securities Commissions [IOSCO],
International Conduct of Business Principles (July 9, 1990), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IO
S CO PD8.pdf [hereinafter The Technical Committee of IOSCO].
18.
Cf., e.g., Dirk Hermann Bliesener, Aufsichtsrechtliche Verhaltenspflichten beim Wertpapierhandel,
205–6 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998) (discussing the developments leading towards this report) (Ger.).
19. The Technical Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, paras. 18–21.
20. Id. paras. 4–7.
21. Id. para. 12.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 8–9.

2020] TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW IN FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION

91

to “seek from its customers information about their financial situation,
investment experience and investment objectives relevant to the services to be
provided” (to “know one’s customer”);
to “make adequate disclosure of relevant material information in its dealings
with its customers” (in order to provide the customer with all relevant information
needed to make informed investment decisions and in order to keep her informed
as to the execution of orders); and
to “try to avoid conflicts of interest, and when they cannot be avoided, [to]
ensure that its customers are fairly treated.”
These principles were later taken up, and refined further, by the IOSCO
“Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,” first promulgated in
September 1998,24 the last comprehensive update of which was published in 2003.25
To be sure, conduct-of-business standards as part of regulatory (as distinct from
contract law) frameworks for the provision of investment services are considerably
older than these international standards. Within the United States, they were first
introduced by federal securities legislation in the 1930s and 1940s, most notably the
Securities Exchange Act of 193426 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,27
which, in conjunction with SEC Rules adopted under the Securities Exchange Act,
prescribed a number of transaction-oriented standards for the provision of
investment services (in a wide, non-technical sense).28
Given not just the global importance of the City of London, but also, at the
time, the United Kingdom’s considerable influence on the content of European
legislation, the comprehensive reform of the regulatory framework for financial
services undertaken by the British legislator in the 1980s can be identified as yet
another important milestone in the process of global convergence of such
standards. Replacing the former, exclusively self-regulatory arrangements with an
integrated system of self-regulatory bodies and oversight by a public authority,
Part I, Chapter V of UK Financial Services Act of 1986 (1986 c. 60) established the
statutory basis for a complex set of conduct-of-business requirements that had to
be developed by the Financial Services Authority (formerly, the “Securities and

24. Int’l Org. of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,
at 33–41, (Sept. 1998) https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf.
25. Int’l Org. of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,
at 32–39, (May 2003), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf.
26. See MiFID II, supra note 3.
27. See supra note 4.
28. See generally, for example, HAZEN, supra note 7, at 18–21, for a useful introduction to these
statutes and their historic background; compare HAZEN, supra note 7, at 632–47, and 2 LOUIS LOSS,
JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1608–25 (7th ed.
2018), for general discussions of the interplay between regulatory conduct-of-business standards and
fiduciary law in the U.S.
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Investments Board”) and a number of recognized (sector-specific) self-regulatory
organizations (SROs).29
Within the European Economic Community (as it then was), Article 11 of the
Investment Services Directive (ISD) of 199330 first established an obligation for
Member States to introduce a range of harmonized, yet rather broadly defined
conduct-of-business standards for the provision of investment and related services.
Significantly, the requirements, to a large extent, were a verbatim adaptation of the
1990 IOSCO “Principles,” reflecting not just the latter’s usefulness as a technical
source of inspiration for legislators world-wide, but also their relevance as a driving
force for the trend towards global convergence. The requirements were later taken
up, and refined further, by the successors to the 1993 ISD, namely, the (first)
markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) of 200431 and the current
regime, laid down in Articles 24 and 25 of MiFID II.32
Against this backdrop, the publication of the first version of the IOSCO
“Principles,” in 1990s, clearly was not the trigger of global convergence, but merely
a reflection of a growing convergence that had started some time before. For a
number of reasons, the significance of the ‘Principles’ goes far beyond a mere
formal recognition of that trend and helps explain the successful emergence of
genuinely transnational standards in the field, however:
First, the origins in an institutionalized cooperation of securities authorities
clearly distinguishes the “Principles” from other initiatives for the global
harmonization of laws, as they do not just reflect the perspective of an impressive
range of important jurisdictions, but also reflect these jurisdictions’ willingness to
coordinate their respective laws and enforcement regimes accordingly. Originating
from the Inter-American Conference of Securities Commissioners (established in
1974), IOSCO had been created as a global institution with an impressively broad
membership base in the mid 1980s.33 By instituting an international “working group
on Principles of Ethical Conduct”, with members from Hong-Kong, Italy, Japan,
Quebec, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, as well as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission of the United States, with Australia as a correspondent member,34
IOSCO’s Technical Committee had, in fact, brought together authorities from the
29.
See, in particular, Financial Services Act 1986 c. 60 § 48 (Eng.)(authorizing the
promulgation of conduct-of-business rules by the FSA); see also id. § 119(1)(a) (regarding the SRO’s
powers to promulgate separate standards of conduct).
30. Council Directive 93/22, art. 11, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27, 37.
31.
Directive 2004/39, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
Markets in Financial Instruments Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive
93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 16–18.
32. See MiFID II, supra note 3.
33.
See, e.g., EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE
LAW, THE ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS, 173–74 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
34. The Technical Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, ¶ 2.
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most important financial markets world-wide. While in itself the result of
technocratic regulation without participation of democratically elected political
actors, this background undoubtedly helped enhance the legitimacy of the
“Principles” in the eyes of legislators of participating jurisdictions, inasmuch as they
could be interpreted as reflecting the accumulated expertise of leading authorities in
the field of securities regulation. In this respect, the IOSCO standards fall in line
with the development of international standard setting in the area of financial
regulation more generally (sometimes referred to as “The Global Financial
System”), which was first associated mainly with the activities of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision in the 1970s and was reinforced through
various policy initiatives by the G-20 nations under the auspices of the newly created
Financial Stability Board after the global financial crisis.35 To be sure, IOSCO’s
influence on global legislative developments has been limited so far, especially by
comparison with the output generated by the Basel Committee and its impact on
the convergence of regulatory frameworks in the field of prudential banking
regulation.36 Although national interpretations of the standards and enforcement
practices continue to differ considerably between individual jurisdictions at a more
granular level,37 the relevance of IOSCO’s work on conduct-of-business standards
is hardly disputable, precisely because the “Principles” reflected (and reinforced)
earlier trends towards global convergence, which were then taken up also in
incoming European legislation.
Secondly, and related to the foregoing, the interplay between international
standards with incoming EU regulation certainly played an important role as a
driving force towards global convergence. The IOSCO “Principles,” as noted
before, were formative for the development of harmonized conduct-of-business
standards under the European Investment Services Directive of 199338 and,
subsequently, MiFID I and MiFID II,39 reinforcing their importance as a global
benchmark. At the same time, the representation of European jurisdictions in the
working group arguably was instrumental in shaping their character as a product of
genuinely transnational collaboration between legal systems of different origins.
Motivated by the objective to create a common Internal Market for financial
services among the Member States of the European Economic Community and,
35.
See, for example, CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM,
70–90 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012), and Helleiner, supra note 15, at 232–49, for a general discussion of
the different standard setting bodies. See also, ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS
TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE (2011), for an analysis of
the crisis-driven history of the relevant institutional arrangements.
36.
Brummer, supra note 35, at 78.
37.
Compare, for example, Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007), and Mark J. Roe., Public and
Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009), for illustrative
trans-Atlantic analyses.
38.
See supra, note 30.
39.
See supra, notes 31 and 32, respectively.
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subsequently, the European Community and the European Union,40 European
legislation and European institutions thus contributed to, and reinforced, a more
general trend towards global convergence of financial law and regulation and
established themselves as an important driving force towards the globalization of
markets and relevant legal frameworks (and the rise of European financial markets
began to balance out the dominance of US law and regulation as the dominant rulemaker for global transactions). In this respect, the development of transnational
conduct-of-business standards for the fiduciary relationship between financial
intermediaries and their customers mirror a broader trend in international financial
regulation, which can be observed particularly clearly in the field of banking
regulation.41
Thirdly, by taking the form of an easily accessible, concise, indeed rather simple
document, the standards certainly were highly conducive to be used for application
across a wide variety of different jurisdictions. As formulated in the IOSCO
“Principles,” the conduct-of-business standards do not even purport to provide a
comprehensive legal framework for the formation and execution of contracts
between intermediaries and their customers, or, indeed, for specific means of
enforcement of duties arising thereunder. With a focus on individual aspects of the
intermediary-customer relationship, they merely establish minimum qualitative
standards addressing agency problems in general, and conflicts of interests and
information asymmetries in particular, between the two parties – standards that can
(and, indeed, are designed to) be implemented and enforced differently in different
legal and institutional environments. This approach was clearly motivated by
residual differences among IOSCO member states in terms of both substantive legal
nature and enforcement mechanisms.42
Importantly, this background reflects a need to redefine what is actually meant
by “fiduciary law” in a transnational context. Despite obvious parallels and
similarities between the regulatory standards and traditional concepts of the
common law of fiduciary relationships,43 transnational conduct-of-business
standards pertaining to the fiduciary relationship between financial intermediaries
and their customers are generic in the sense that they can, and will, apply irrespective
of whether or not the legal environment is constituted by common law principles.
As illustrated by the IOSCO “Principles,” transnational law governing fiduciary

40.
See infra Section III.A, for a discussion of the relevant policy and legal background.
41.
Compare BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 45–48 (discussing the impact of European financial
law making on global financial governance), with KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN
EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
SYSTEMIC RISK, ch. 4 (2005) (portraying a general analysis of the emergence of global ‘soft law’ in
financial regulation).
42.
Cf. The Technical Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, ¶ 25 (“Conduct of business rules
are implemented by the different member organisations in a variety of ways: laws; regulations; internal
rules within a company or institution; unwritten principles and customs; case law.”).
43.
See infra Section II.B.
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relationships in the field of financial intermediation, in order to be adaptable across
different jurisdictions with different systems of private law, inevitably has to be
defined exclusively by its object and objectives rather than by reference to the
doctrinal roots of fiduciary law in common law legal systems. The quest, in other
words, has been for universally acceptable solutions to common problems deriving
from the status of the relevant parties to contractual relationships (which, in a
common law environment or in law and economics terminology influenced by
concepts of common law, can be characterized as “agency” or “fiduciary”
relationships). In order to be adaptable, the relevant standards therefore had to
establish “functional” (as distinct from doctrinal-technical) fiduciary law. By
contrast, a mere “transplantation” of common law fiduciary law into other legal
environments, i.e., the application of the same set of substantive rules without regard
to the specific nature of the applicable contract law regime, would inevitably create
coordination problems between conflicting regimes.44
B. From fiduciary law to “functional fiduciary law”: the fiduciary roots of conduct-of-business
regulation (and some implications on the relevance of regulatory fiduciary duties for the
intermediary-customer relationship)
If, as discussed before, converging conduct-of-business standards in the field
of securities intermediation can be interpreted as the establishment of transnational
fiduciary law in the field of financial intermediation, this finding, as such, tells us
little about the functions of the relevant rules within the broader legal framework
that governs the rights and duties of parties to relevant contracts, especially vis-à-vis
the applicable contract law regime. This caveat should not come as a surprise:
Precisely because the relevant standards address only selected, if crucial aspects of
the intermediary-customer relationship, and because they do so at a rather abstract
level, their technical relevance (and doctrinal interpretation) is bound to differ
depending on the nature and content of the relevant contract law environment.
In order to facilitate the understanding of the core characteristics of
transnational fiduciary law in the field of financial intermediation in substantive as
well as in functional terms, however, the analysis clearly cannot stop here. In this
context, it is particularly important to note that conduct-of-business regulation for
financial services has never – and nowhere – been developed or applied
independently from principles or doctrines of general private law originating outside
the regulatory sphere. Rather, such standards can be said to have complemented general
principles of contract or, indeed, fiduciary (or agency) law: Both from a historic
perspective and in terms of substantive content, they were developed in order to
enhance the protection of investors against intermediaries – the beneficiaries of
agency relationships in a wider sense, who otherwise could rely only on general
44.
In this regard, the on-going discussion on the legal nature of regulatory conduct-ofbusiness rules and their implications on contractual duties of intermediaries in a number of European
jurisdictions can be interpreted as ample evidence. See infra Section III.C.
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principles of contract, tort, agency, or, again, fiduciary law.45 Historically, the
emergence of conduct-of-business standards in US securities regulation certainly
was revolutionary, less in terms of the substantive content (which, in many respects,
can be traced back to general principles of common law), but rather in terms of the
transformation of such principles into mandatory requirements, to be
operationalized in each securities firm’s operations and business practices and to be
monitored by public authorities ex ante. In other words: It is hardly surprising that
the gradual recognition of duties of care, knowledge, and skill in the applicable
regulatory frameworks, to some extent at least, mirrored pre-existing general principles
of law, including core principles of the common law of fiduciary duties. Nor should
it come as a surprise that regulatory rules may come to be interpreted, and applied,
by recourse to general principles of law (including, again, principles of fiduciary law)
– and may even influence the interpretation and further development of such
general principles in law suits ex post. Historically, the interplay between regulatory
and legal conduct-of-business standards in US law provides ample evidence in this
regard, where both regulatory agencies (in particular, the Securities Exchange
Commission) and courts, respectively, have repeatedly (a) reinforced existing
regulatory norms by adapting fiduciary principles in the course of their
interpretation in specific circumstances, (b) transformed fiduciary principles into
new regulatory requirements, or (c) “filled the gaps” left by regulatory requirements
through imposing additional restrictions on intermediaries based on general
principles of fiduciary law.46
Against the historic backdrop of conduct-of-business regulation, it is also not
surprising that the restatement of conduct-of-business requirements in the IOSCO
principles, with their focus on establishing “functional fiduciary law” (a duty of care
and skill in the interest of customers and on preventing or, at least, mitigating
potential conflicts of interests on the part of the intermediary and their implications
for the customers), bears parallels with the traditional emanations of fiduciary
principles as developed in common law. To be sure, differences between traditional
concepts of fiduciary law on the one hand and the individual conduct-of-business
standards certainly exist, and the regulatory standard often deviates substantially
from generally accepted principles of fiduciary law.47 Nonetheless, the parallels are
particularly obvious with regard to the fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interests,
45.
Compare, for a forceful statement to that effect, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963), (noting that “[t]he Investment Advisers Act of 1940 . . . reflects a
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship . . . .”).
46.
See Jackson & Gillis, supra note 6, at 868–69 (discussing specific examples). Cf., HAZEN,
supra note 7, at 632–39; LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 28, at 1608–25. Compare, The Law
Commission, supra note 2, Part VI, for a useful analysis of the policy choices encountered when
structuring the interplay between regulatory and private law requirements from an English law
perspective.
47.
One (important) example is the regulatory requirement to treat customers fairly, which
does not appear to have origins in English case law. Cf. JOANNA BENJAMIN, FINANCIAL LAW, ¶¶ 27.11,
27.21-27.25 (2007).
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the fiduciary’s duty not to exploit his position at the expense of the beneficiary, and
the duty of loyalty to the beneficiary.48
It follows that regulatory requirements and private law, including fiduciary
principles, pertaining to the same activities – different types of financial services –
cannot, and should not, be conceptualized as functionally separate regimes, but
rather have to be understood as functional complements, designed to work together
to ensure adequate levels of investor protection. Conduct-of-business regulation
and parallel principles of private law thus present an illustrative showcase for the
more general observation that the purposes of modern private law, almost
inevitably, are not confined to defining the rules for private contracting in full
freedom (“private autonomy” in a civil law perspective), but usually include (semi)regulatory objectives to ensure fairness between unequal parties.49 Fiduciary law,
with its focus on the protection of “vital interactions of high trust and confidence
resulting in one party’s implicit dependency upon and peculiar vulnerability to
another” by “imposing strict duties requiring fiduciaries to act honestly, selflessly,
with integrity, and in the best interests of their beneficiaries.”50
With the recognition and refinement of requirements addressing agency
problems between intermediaries and their customers, more specifically: structural
information asymmetries and conflicts of interests inherent in the business model
of financial intermediaries and the resulting incentives for the expropriation of
customers by intermediaries, conduct-of-business regulation can be interpreted as
facilitating additional enforcement and sanctions mechanisms to duties at least some
of which, in substance, existed previously (in fiduciary law or elsewhere in general
private law). To be sure, within the EU as well as elsewhere, regulatory standards
apply in their own right, irrespective of the applicable private law. From a purely
regulatory perspective, it may therefore appear pointless to discuss their private law
implications.51 However, given the limitations of norm enforcement by public
authorities generally (attributable not just to limited resources, but possibly also to
the incentive structures of public officials),52 it is fair to assume that the

48.
Compare The Law Commission, supra note 2, ¶ 2.4.9, for a useful summary of the core
elements of fiduciary duties in the present context.
49.
Compare Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395
(2016), for a recent general discussion. And see Alexander Hellgardt, Regulierung und Privatrecht, in 216
ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 349 (2016), for an impressive analysis of the regulatory
functions of private law (in German).
50.
In the words of Rotman, supra note 1, at 986. Accord LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY
LAW, 250–55 (2005).
51.
See Luca Enriquez & Matteo Gargantini, The Overarching Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the
Client in MiFID II, in REGULATION OF THE EU FINANCIAL MARKETS: MIFID II AND MIFIR, ch. 4, ¶
4.16 (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini, eds., 2017) (discussing the nature of EU conduct-of-business
standards).
52.
On the respective advantages and shortcomings of public and private law enforcement, see
generally, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J.
ECON. LIT. 45 (2000); Polinsky & Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
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effectiveness of regulatory norms from a customer perspective, to the extent that the
substance of such norms is not at least replicated by corresponding private laws,
crucially depends on whether or not private enforcement of the regulatory norms is
possible in the respective jurisdiction.
The above analysis should not be misinterpreted as suggesting that regulatory
requirements, as enforced by public authorities ex ante, and general principles of law,
as enforced by courts in private law suits ex post, are functionally identical sides of
the same coin. They are, in fact, not just operationalized in different ways, but may
also serve partly different objectives.53 Nor should it be forgotten that the
substantive content of the two regimes may differ and, indeed, conflict.54 At the
same time, though, it is important to recall that even in the United States, as the
country of origin of modern conduct-of-business regulation, where relevant
principles had been developed long before the trend towards global convergence of
securities laws in the 1980s and 1990s arose, the regulation of the intermediarycustomer relationship has transcended traditional concepts of fiduciary law from
the very origins of modern securities regulation in the 1930s and 1940s. The
emergence of what we could describe as “functional fiduciary law”, a set of rules
and requirements addressing the specific agency problems of the relationship
between intermediaries and investors, thus took place long before the relevant
substantive rules became exported to, and adapted by, foreign jurisdictions in the
course of the globalization of securities regulation at a later stage. As a consequence,
the analysis of fiduciary principles in the area of financial intermediation inevitably
has to rely on a non-technical, “functional” understanding of fiduciary principles –
an understanding that is determined by the protective objectives of fiduciary law55
rather than by its traditional emanation in common law.
Similar considerations apply with regard to the resulting tensions between
regulatory standards and private law – and thus the need to determine whether and
to what extent the applicable regulatory standards should have a bearing on the
individually enforceable private law duties arising within intermediary-customer
relationship (whether these follow from general contract law or, for that matter,
other general principles of law, including tort, agency, or indeed fiduciary law in the
technical sense).

LAW AND ECONOMICS 403 (Polinsky & Shavell, eds., 2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 24 (9th ed. 2014).
53.
Note, in this context, that the IOSCO “Principles,” in addition to the protection of
investors, are also designed so as to protect market integrity, which certainly does not form part of
intermediaries’ duties to customers under general contract or, indeed, fiduciary law. The Technical
Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, at 9–11.
54.
See Jackson & Gillis, supra note 6, at 868–69, for a functional analysis of overlaps and
tensions between fiduciary law and regulation in the U.S. Compare The Law Commission, supra note 2,
Part VI, for a similar analysis from an English law perspective.
55.
As to which, see, again, supra text accompanying note 49.
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In light of the foregoing problems of coordination between the two regimes,
cases where the respective requirements differ from and, potentially, conflict with
each other, therefore have to be accepted as inevitable. The need to reconcile
regulatory duties – “functional fiduciary law” within the meaning defined above –
with each jurisdiction’s private law environment therefore has to be considered as
part and parcel of the emerging body of transnational fiduciary law in the area of
financial services regulation. In a transnational context, defining a solution to these
problems of coordination will be particularly difficult precisely because the
operation of “functional fiduciary law” or, at least, its impact on the intermediaries’
privately enforceable duties vis-à-vis their customers, is inevitably contingent on
how each individual jurisdiction will coordinate regulatory duties on the one hand and
the applicable private law on the other hand. One could characterize this problem as
the fundamental “contingency problem” for the development of transnational
fiduciary law in the field of financial services: the problem that a truly transnational
understanding of what constitutes fiduciary obligations of financial intermediaries
towards their customers and how these obligations affect the customers’ position
in their individual contractual relationships is contingent on the interplay between
regulatory rules and the applicable private law.
Given the long-standing trend towards international cooperation between
supervisory authorities and convergence of regulatory standards as well as
supervisory practices in all fields of financial regulation and supervision, there is no
reason to doubt that the implementation and supervisory enforcement of regulatory
conduct-of-business standards, as such, can be accomplished effectively and
consistently (and the convergence of applicable standards, developed within the
institutional framework of IOSCO, provides ample evidence in this regard). The
“contingency problem” identified above, by contrast, is inevitably more difficult to
resolve – and it clearly presents a rather complex impediment for the development
of transnational fiduciary law in the field. The case of conduct-of-business
regulation in the European legislative framework, to be considered in the next
section of the present Article, illustrates the point.
III. MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW APPLY TRANSNATIONALLY:
THE CASE OF EUROPEAN FINANCIAL LAW
A. European financial law and conduct-of-business regulation: a primer
With far-reaching powers to enact legislation designed to harmonize national
laws or, indeed, to create universal rules for application across no less than 28 (postBrexit: 27) jurisdictions with different legal traditions, substantive laws, and
enforcement institutions, the European Union56 indisputably is an important driver
towards convergence in all areas of law and regulation covered by the mandate (and
56.
The same already applied to its predecessors, namely the European Economic Community
and the European Community.
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corresponding powers) laid down in the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and,
in particular, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). It
is an open question whether or not (and, if so, to what extent and subject to which
qualifications) European financial law would qualify as a “transnational legal order”.
To be sure, EU law generally constitutes a legal order, and a highly developed one
for that matter, considering the specific constitutionalization of the European
Union (not quite a federation of states, but certainly more than an international
organization), the comprehensive perimeter of European economic lawmaking as a
whole (which covers legislation in all areas of economic activity), the existence of
European (as distinct from national) regulatory and supervisory agencies, and the
corresponding high level of harmonization of national laws and regulations.57 Taken
together, though, these aspects certainly distinguish European financial law from
other areas of international cooperation of legislators, authorities and/or courts in
different jurisdictions.58 More specifically, it could be argued that, owing to the high
level of integration of national jurisdictions the EU Member States, EU lawmaking,
even though it formally involves a multitude of jurisdictions, is structurally closer to
coordination problems within a single jurisdiction and thus lacks the characteristics
of genuine transnational legal ordering. In this context, it is worth noting that, under
the European Treaties, compliance with, and implementation of, legal rules adopted
at the European level takes place within a pre-defined legal framework, in which
Member States are bound to give effect to EU legislation, and judiciary powers to
resolve any controversy as to its legality and substantive content are allocated to the
European Court of Justice, whose decisions, again, are binding on the Member
States.59
It is neither possible nor necessary to fully explore the nature of EU financial
law within the present Article. However, European financial law and the relevant
institutional arrangements established within the EU may have to be qualified for
the purposes of transnational law theory, it is certainly true that the EU and its
institutions have played an important role not just in shaping the “transnational
financial legal order”60 established at a global level, but also in terms of implementing
the work promulgated by international standard-setters. In the field of securities
regulation, as with all areas of financial regulation more generally, European
legislation has thus been instrumental to turn international “soft law” standards
57. Cf. Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS 3, at 5 (2015) (defining a transnational legal order as: “a collection of formalized legal
norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice
across national jurisdictions”).
58.
Compare id. at 18–21, for a general discussion of what constitutes the relevant
“transnational”element.
59.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 267, July 6, 2016, O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU] (setting out the procedure and status of
adjudicating on “preliminary reference” by national courts); see generally, DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH
DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 166–88 (4th ed. 2019).
60.
To borrow the term coined by Helleiner, supra note 15, at 238.
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promulgated by international standard-setting bodies (such as IOSCO) into “hard
law,” be it in the form of Directives (which harmonize the national laws of the
Member States) or of Regulations (which apply directly and universally in all
Member States).61 Both as an increasingly powerful negotiating party in working
groups responsible for the development and the reform of regulatory standards and
in view of its powers to render such standards effective across a large and important
market, the EU has contributed to the effectiveness and success of that legal order,
making it a useful object of study for present purposes irrespective of whether
European law itself qualifies as a transnational legal order in its own right or merely
as a (partly autonomous) subset of a larger system.
Moreover, EU legislation in the field of financial services regulation,
irrespective of the constitutional environment and its embeddedness in an
institutional structure defined in the Treaties, arguably is also a showcase for more
general problems of coordination between different legislators, authorities, and
courts, problems pertaining to the national “operationalization” of legal rules and
norms originating at a supranational level. The on-going controversy about the need
for private law implications of regulatory conduct-of-business standards established
by EU law62 is a particularly illustrative case in point. These problems, which—as
noted before—inevitably come with implications for the effectiveness of any
attempt to apply solutions developed at a supranational level to circumstances
within a national turf, are likely to be more or less identical with those observable
in the context of transnational legal orders proper.63 Irrespective of the idiosyncratic
characteristics of EU financial law and regulation (and EU economic law-making
more generally), an analysis of the conditions for and the functioning of the
harmonization of conduct-of-business standards for financial intermediaries
established in EU law can thus be expected to contribute to our understanding of
transnational legal orders more generally. Much the same applies with regard to the
interplay between the different levels of rule-makers and standard-setters, and its
implications on the interpretation and implementation of both legal rules and
principles of supranational origin in the national legal environments, respectively.64
Against this general backdrop, it should be recalled that conduct-of-business
regulation has been a core element of EU financial law ever since the introduction
of harmonized principles for the regulation of investment services with the
Investment Services Directive of 1993. The relevant legal acts—the Investment
Services Directive, MiFID I and MiFID II65—were all enacted on the basis of
61.
On the differences and relevance of Directives and Regulations (as defined by TFEU
art. 288(2) and (3)); see generally, CHALMERS, DAVIES & MONTI, supra note 59, at 114.
62. See infra Section III.C.
63.
See generally, Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 57, at 31–55 (discussing general aspects of the
formation and institutionalization of transnational legal orders).
64. Cf., id. at 55–63 (discussing various scenarios of how transnational legal orders trigger similar
impacts).
65. See supra, notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
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Treaty provisions mandating the adoption of directives for the harmonization of
national conditions for market entry by individual providers of goods or services or
for companies from other EU Member States.66 Significantly, the relevant provision
(just as its predecessors in earlier Treaties)67 is confined to the removal of
differences in the conditions for market participation in order to facilitate the
creation of an integrated “Internal Market” for goods and services, historically the
core policy objective of the European Union (cf. Art. 3(3) TEU), which requires a
regulatory “level playing field” and, thus, harmonized rules governing the provision
of financial services across all Member States.68 Just as with other aspects of EU
financial regulation, the harmonization of conduct-of-business standards for
investment firms, which (at least initially) accomplished the liberalization of national
regulations, served as an instrument to facilitate the mutual access of financial
intermediaries licensed in one of the Member States to what used to be reclusive
domestic markets.69 Given that this clearly served the interests of the regulated
industry, it is fair to note close parallels between the development of European
financial regulation on the one hand and the driving forces behind the emergence
of global (“transnational”) conduct-of-business standards identified above:70 At both
levels, the standards were driven by the desire to provide a mutually acceptable basis
for market access and market integration, and at both levels, this motive may have
helped to enhance the industry’s readiness to adapt and comply.
While allowing for a comprehensive harmonization of the regulatory
frameworks (not just) for securities intermediaries, however, this constitutional
background also accounts for an important limitation to the role of EU legislation
as a catalyst for convergence in the conditions for the provision of such services
across the Member States. Since the focus was on the harmonization of conditions
for market access, EU financial law has never aimed at a full harmonization of all
norms of relevance for the contractual relationship between intermediaries and
customers—an attempt that would not just have been technically difficult (given
residual differences in the national private laws of the Member States) and fraught
with political controversies. Arguably, it also would have exceeded the scope of the
66.
See TFEU, supra note 59, art. 53(1) (“In order to make it easier for persons to take up and
pursue activities as self-employed persons, the European Parliament and the Council shall . . . issue
directives for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal
qualifications and for the coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action in Member States concerning the taking-up and pursuit of activities as self-employed person.”).
67. TFEU art. 53(1) effectively replicates the wording of art. 47(2) of the former Treaty on the
European Community, which itself was based on art. 57(2) of the Treaty on the European Economic
Community.
68. Compare NIAMH MOLONEY, EU SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION
8–13 (3rd ed. 2014), for a general discussion of the constitutional basis for EU securities regulation.
69. See id. at 19–22; and see Jens-Hinrich Binder, Vom offenen zum regulierten Markt: Finanzint
ermediation, EU-Wirtschaftsverfassung und der Individualschutz der Kapitalanbieter, ZEUP – ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 569 (2017), for a detailed analysis of the parallels between EU banking
and securities regulation in this regard (in German).
70. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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relevant legislative powers, which (at least expressly) do not provide for a
comprehensive harmonization of general private law (even if confined to individual
areas of particular relevance to the Internal Market).71
To be sure, as will be explored in the following subsection, significant aspects
of the European conduct-of-business standards (just as the original IOSCO
“Principles” of 1990) bear close similarities with traditional concepts of fiduciary
relationships recognized by common law. Given the restrictions of their legal basis
in European Treaty law, the relevant provisions, nonetheless, must not be
misinterpreted as mandating the introduction of fiduciary duties in a technical sense,
that matter being outside the scope of the relevant instruments and left to the
discretion of the Member States.72 Just as the IOSCO “Principles,” the relevant
standards therefore can be characterized as “functional fiduciary law” within the
meaning defined above: While clearly addressing core problems of the principalagent relationship between intermediaries and clients and applicable to relationships
that would qualify as fiduciary in common law, the interplay between the regulatory
standards and the applicable private law environment of the Member States is, at
least, not specified in detail by European law. Whether or not at least some form of
private law implications still ought to be recognized as a matter of European law,
remains an open question.73
B. What has become of the IOSCO “Principles”: conduct-of-business regulation in current
EU legislation
While a detailed analysis of the current version of conduct-of-business
requirements for investment firms in European law, laid down in Articles 24 and 25
of MiFID II (as well as in delegated legal instruments adopted by the European
Commission in connection with these provisions)74 would be outside the scope of

71.
See Binder, supra note 69, at 588–89, 592–93, 596–98, for a more in-depth discussion. And
compare Johannes Köndgen, Rules of Conduct: Further Harmonisation?, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES
MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 115 (Guido Ferrarini ed., 1998),
for an early assessment of the limitations for (and the rationale of) the harmonization of conduct-ofbusiness standards through the Investment Services Directive of 1993.
72.
Enriquez & Gargantini, supra note 51, ¶ 4.16.
73.
On which, see further infra Section III.C.2.
74.
See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of Apr. 25, 2016, supplementing
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational
requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that
Directive, 2017 O.J. (L 87) 1 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/593 of Apr. 7, 2016,
supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to
safeguarding of financial instruments and funds belonging to clients, product governance obligations
and the rules applicable to the provision or reception of fees, commissions or any monetary or nonmonetary benefits, 2017 O.J. (L 87) 500. Note that the relevant requirements are specified further in
“Guidelines“ promulgated by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (see Art. 25(9)(11) MiFID II, outside the scope of the present Article).
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the present Article,75 the close parallels between the relevant duties and the early
precedents in the IOSCO “Principles” of 1990 are nonetheless worth noting.
Although formulated in significantly more complex terms and in far greater detail,
the relevant provisions take up all aspects of the original principles. As a general
duty that also seeks to fill the gaps left by more specific requirements,76 Art. 24(1)
MiFID II first establishes a general duty of investment firms, “when providing
investment services or, where appropriate, ancillary services to clients, [to] act
honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of . . . clients
. . . .” Art. 24(2), subpara. (2) MiFID II then requires that investment firms
[U]nderstand the financial instruments they offer or recommend, assess the
compatibility of the financial instruments with the needs of the clients to whom it
provides investment services, also taking account of the identified target market of
end clients (…), and ensure that financial instruments are offered or recommended
only when this is in the interest of the client.
Pursuant to Art. 24(3) MiFID II (specified further and complemented with
detailed duties to inform and warn of risks in para. (4) of the same provision), “[a]ll
information, including marketing communications, addressed by the investment
firm to clients or potential clients shall be fair, clear and not misleading. Marketing
communications shall be clearly identifiable as such.” Art. 24(5) MiFID II then
continues to define the format and quality of the required information, which has
to:
[B]e provided in a comprehensible form in such a manner that clients or
potential clients are reasonably able to understand the nature and risks of the
investment service and of the specific type of financial instrument that is being
offered and, consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis.
Member States may allow that information to be provided in a standardised format.
Art. 24(8) and (9) MiFID II restrict the acceptability of commissions or other
benefits by investment firms for the marketing and recommendation of financial
products and thus address an important source of conflicts of interest that could
impair the quality of investment advice and related services. In a similar vein, Art.
24(10) MiFID II prohibits incentive structures that could induce staff to offer
financial products whose acquisition would not be in the client’s best interest.
Complementing these provisions, Art. 25(1) MiFID II then establishes
requirements for the qualification of natural persons providing investment advice
and related services, while Art. 25(2)-(4) MIFID II specify the obligations of
investment firms to explore their clients’ interest prior to the provision of services.

75. See, for example, Enriquez & Gargantini, supra note 51, and Stefan Grundmann & Philipp
Hacker, Conflicts of Interest, in REGULATION OF THE EU FINANCIAL MARKETS: MIFID II AND MIFIR,
ch. 7 (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2017), for more extensive analyses of the current regime.
76.
See Enriquez & Gargantini, supra note 51, ¶¶ 4.16-.22, for further discussion of the
functions of the duty within the MiFID II framework.
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C. The functions and enforcement of conduct-of-business-regulation in Europe: a German and
a European perspective
1.

German law

If the effectiveness of “functional fiduciary law” crucially depends on the
interplay between regulatory standards and the relevant private law environment,77 EU
financial law certainly is a highly illustrative case in point. Just as in other areas of
EU legislation, the introduction of harmonized conduct-of-business standards since
199378 had to be implemented in Member States with different legal traditions,
different contract laws and, in particular, fundamentally different legal regimes
governing the relationship between financial intermediaries and their customers.
Among these, only a small fraction—namely the United Kingdom and Ireland—are
common law jurisdictions, the remainder being variants of civil law legal systems.
While it is, for obvious reasons, impossible to develop a full account of the relevant
private law environments in each and every Member State within the present Article,
it is probably safe to assume that at least in the majority of them, the relevant aspects
of intermediary-client relationships (general duties of care and skill, principles
governing conflicts of interests, as well as duties to inform and disclose) had already
been addressed in the applicable contract law (to some extent, as the case may be,
complemented by general principles of private law).79 Against this backdrop, it
should come as no surprise that the interplay between regulatory conduct-ofbusiness standards and private law has been debated for some time in response to
incoming European legislation, with only few jurisdictions having developed clearcut solutions for the reconciliation of regulatory and private law regimes.80
In this context, German law certainly provides ample illustration. Building
both on general contract law, which does not provide a bespoke regime addressing
intermediary-client relationships, and on general principles of private law, including
on misrepresentation prior to or in the course of contractual relationships, German
courts, in particular in the aftermath of a landmark decision in 1993,81 have over
time defined a rather complex set of duties of care and skill with regard to the
77. Supra Section II.A.
78. On the relevant legal instruments, see supra notes 3 and 30–31 and accompanying text.
79.
For a representative overview, cf. the country reports on selected civil and common law
jurisdictions in A BANK’S DUTY OF CARE, supra note 5, at 61, 85, 109, 135, 167, 201, 249, 285, 329
(discussing Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, England and Wales, Ireland, and the
United States of America, in that order). See also Danny Busch, Why MiFID Matters to Private Law: The
Example of MiFID’s Impact on Asset Managers, 7 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 386 (2012).
80. See, for example, Peter O. Mülbert, The Eclipse of Contract Law in the Investment Firm-ClientRelationship: The Impact of the MiFID on the Law of Contract from a German Perspective, in INVESTOR
PROTECTION IN EUROPE: CORPORATE LAW MAKING, THE MIFID AND BEYOND 299 (Guido
Ferrarini & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2006), for an early assessment of the relevant problems.
81.
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 6, 1993, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 126. See Binder, supra note 5, at 75–76. The
following paragraphs borrow from that publication.
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provision of investment advice, which includes both prescriptive and proscriptive
elements. As established in a large body of case law,82 investment firms are required
(a) to ensure that any advice given has to be commensurate with the investor’s
profile and risk preference, (b) to explore their clients’ expertise, financial position
and risk preference prior to the provision of investment advice, (c) to inform their
clients of all aspects that are material for their investment decisions, (d) to explore
the characteristics and risk profile of any investment recommended to clients, and
(e) to warn clients if on the basis of the exploration of their individual expertise and
risk profile they perceive the client to be unaware of specific risks arising in the
context of a proposed investment. Even though fiduciary law, in the common law
interpretation of the concept, does not exist in German private law, the parallels
between these principles and fiduciary duties in the common law understanding are
obvious.
Nonetheless, the functional interplay between these principles and the
regulatory requirements enacted in order to transpose the incoming European
Directives (first in sections 31-34 and, since 2017, in sections 63-71 of the
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [Securities Trading Act]83) has been debated
controversially in German legal doctrine ever since the transposition of the
Investment Services Directive 1993, while the courts have been reluctant to
recognize any implication of the regulatory regime for the construction of the
contractual relationship between intermediaries and their clients.84 In a few
judgments prior to the transposition of MiFID into the German Securities Trading
Act, the Federal Supreme Court did acknowledge, albeit somewhat imprecisely, that
the regulatory requirements, although based in public law, could have a bearing on
contractual duties to the extent that their objective was to protect the clients, but
that this would not be sufficient to construe duties of care independent from those
established under general contract law.85 In a few decisions, the Federal Supreme
Court and other courts have also referred to provisions of earlier versions of the
WpHG as a basis for a duty to avoid adverse consequences of conflicts of interests
for clients.86 The practical consequences of this approach, however, remained
obscure, and subsequent case law did little to clarify. In the academic literature,
which is frequently cited as persuasive authority by German courts, the controversy
continues about whether, and to what extent, implications of regulatory conductof-business standards on the private-law relationships between intermediaries and
82. See Binder, supra note 5, at 66–81, for an in-depth account of the relevant private law
environment, an analysis of the resulting duties of intermediaries, and references to case law.
83. Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], July 26, 1994, BGBL I at 1749,
repromulgated Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL I at 2708, as amended June 24, 2017, BGBL. I at 1693.
84. See generally, Matthias Casper & Christian Altgen, Germany, in LIABILITY OF ASSET
MANAGERS ¶¶ 4.37-.41 (Danny Busch & Deborah A. DeMott eds., 2012).
85. Cf., e.g., Bundesgerichtschof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 19, 2006, XI ZR 56/05,
170 BGHZ 226 (232); Bundesgerichtschof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 24, 2011, XI ZR
329/00, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift–Rechtsprechungsreport [NJW–RR] 405 (406) 2002.
86. Cf., e.g., 170 BGHZ 226 (234).
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customers ought to be recognized. While a majority of authors support the
prevailing opinion, whereby regulatory conduct-of-business standards, qua rooted
in public law, cannot be considered as authoritative for the determination of
obligations arising in private law, an increasing number of publications have argued
for a reconciliation of both regimes in recent years.87
Given residual differences between the two regimes that cannot be explored
in detail within the present Article, this state of affairs is clearly unsatisfactory, and
strong arguments have been advanced supporting a further realignment between
the two regimes. Nonetheless, German law as it currently stands continues to
interpret both regimes as functionally and doctrinally separate.88 German courts still
hesitate to reconcile their interpretation of the applicable contract (and general
private) law with the substance of conduct-of-business regulations, to the extent
these are designed to protect investors. As a result, the “functional fiduciary law”
established by the transposition of European law in the German Securities Trading
Act, has not transformed into obligations under German private law as yet,
although, on occasion, it has had an influence on the interpretation and doctrinal
analysis of the applicable private law regime.
2.

European law

Given that similar problems of coordination have arisen in other European
jurisdictions as well as in Germany and that different national approaches, as
discussed above, will come with different results not just in terms of the rights of
individual investors, but also in terms of the effectiveness of the regulatory
standards as such, it is hardly surprising that the implications of the harmonized
conduct-of-business standards should have become the object of a general
discussion that transcends the national jurisdictions of the Member States.
Significantly, the question of whether or not these standards should be interpreted
as also influencing the obligations of intermediaries under national contract (and/or
general private) laws, has been debated not just as a matter of national doctrine (e.g.,
in order to ensure consistency of obligations and to avoid contradictory sanctions),
but also as a matter of EU law.
At first sight, this may appear to be inconsistent both with the fact that the
relevant European legislation has never itself prescribed specific sanctions, let alone
the introduction of fiduciary principles proper in the national laws of the Member
States, and with the lack of legislative powers for the harmonization of general
private law in the EU Treaties.89 Yet, while both aspects remain largely undisputed,

87. Cf. Binder, supra note 5, at 72–74 (summarizing the case law and the relevant academic
literature).
88. See Kuntz, supra note 10, for a recent analysis and forceful arguments supporting
convergence between the two regimes.
89. See The Technical Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, ¶¶ 25–29; see also supra notes 69 and
71 and accompanying text.
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it is obvious that differences in terms of obligations under national private law may
come with implications for cross-border competition in the Internal Market in at
least two respects:90 first, if, and to the extent that national private law imposes a
stricter standard on financial intermediaries than the standards defined in the
harmonized regulatory frameworks, intermediaries operating in this jurisdiction face
higher costs than they would incur in other jurisdictions where the applicable private
law is more closely realigned with the harmonized regulatory standards. Second,
where national private laws are less strict than the regulatory regime, the absence of
private law enforcement as a sanctions regime complementing oversight and
enforcement by supervisory authorities may impair the effectiveness of the
regulatory standards, which in turn may create competitive disadvantages for similar
activities carried out in other Member States. Either scenario would be problematic
in view of the EU’s overarching policy objective to create an integrated Internal
Market with harmonized “rules of the game.”91 Moreover, the latter scenario would
be inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness, a core principle of European law
developed in case law by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ),
whereby the duty of Member States to comply with European law implies their duty
to provide for effective implementation (including by sanctions in national law).92
Interestingly, in spite of these rather obvious consequences, ECJ case law has
remained vague in this regard. In a prominent case addressing the question whether
MiFID I required the Member States to provide for individually enforceable
sanctions for a violation of the know-your-customer requirements stated therein,
the Court held that, in the absence of specific EU legislation to that end, the
Member States, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, remained
entitled to define the sanctions regimes according to their own preferences,93 which,
arguably, includes the freedom to restrict implementation to regulatory requirements
without direct implications for obligations under general private law. With the
doctrinal debate on-going, it remains to be seen whether this principle will be upheld
in future cases, even if it could be established that the lack of individually
enforceable private law duty, in the circumstances, reduces the effective
implementation of the regulatory standards.
90.

Compare Danny Busch, The Private Law Effect of MiFID I and MiFID II, in REGULATION OF
¶¶ 20.03-.27 (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini
eds., 2017), for a more extensive analysis discussing different scenarios that have arisen in recent
practice.
91. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
92. See generally, e.g., TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 418–76 (2d ed.
2006); Walter van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, 37 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 501 (2000).
93. Case C-604/11, Genil 48 SL, Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos SL v Bankinter SA, Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX, ¶¶ 57, 58; confirmed in Case C-312/14, Banif
Plus Bank Zrt. v Márton Lantos and Mártonné Lantos, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX, ¶ 79. See Busch, supra note
90, for a critical analysis in the light of Court of Justice of the European Union case law in similar
scenarios. Cf. Stefan Grundmann, The Bankinter Case on MIFID Regulation and Contract Law, 9 EUR. REV. CONT.
L. 267 (2013) (supporting a more extensive interpretation of the regulatory requirements).
THE EU FINANCIAL MARKETS: MIFID II AND MIFIR,
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Whatever the future may bring, both the on-going doctrinal debate on the
private law implications of regulatory standards and the different approaches in
place across the EU Member States clearly illustrate that the “transnationalization”
of fiduciary rules for the relationship between financial intermediaries and their
customers, despite the high level of global convergence of regulatory conduct-ofbusiness standards, is a process which has not yet reached its end. Only some
jurisdictions thus far have resolved the problems of coordination between the two
regimes, transforming “functional fiduciary law” into private law obligations in one
way or another. In others, the two regimes continue to operate separately,
sometimes on the basis of rather vague principles, which creates legal uncertainty
for both intermediaries and their customers. It is at least conceivable that future
developments, either through changes in the applicable EU legislation or in the
form of a revision of ECJ case law, could trigger further convergence in this respect.
For the time being, however, convergence with international trends so far has been
restricted to the regulatory sphere.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Over many decades, regulatory frameworks for the provision of financial
services—in particular, vis-à-vis retail customers—have come to complement
national contract laws with conduct-of-business standards designed to establish
minimum qualitative standards of care, skill, and honesty for the provision of a wide
range of services to customers. At least parts of this regime mirror and, to some
extent, replicate duties which have also been recognized as fiduciary duties in
general private law, particularly because (and to the extent that) the underlying
contractual relationships qualify as agency relationships in common law. Modern
conduct-of-business standards, developed in order to facilitate the effective
protection of investors through ex ante supervision and enforcement of qualitative
requirements, thus have come to complement and, in part, to supersede,
functionally parallel duties that would otherwise be enforceable ex post, within the
context of individual lawsuits brought by customers against their intermediary.
Historically, this development can be explained with the desire to balance out
deregulatory developments in US state legislation since the beginning of the 20th
century through the imposition of harmonized standards in federal securities
regulation in the 1930s.
This process has been taken up by a global trend towards converging
regulatory standards since the 1980s, which—both in international standards, in
particular, the IOSCO “Principles”) and European legislation—has been driven by
the desire to open up national financial markets and facilitate cross-border
competition for financial services intermediaries. Though certainly onerous in terms
of compliance cost, the adaptation and implementation of a growing body of
transnational conduct-of-business standards thus certainly has served industry
interests. In this regard, securities regulation clearly is in line with the emergence of
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international standards in other fields of financial regulation—particularly including
the area of prudential requirements for the establishment and on-going operations
of banking institutions—and it is reflective of the relevance of “soft law” as a
driving force behind the development of transnational legal orders more generally.94
With regulatory (as distinct from contract) law as a platform and transmission
mechanism for the emergence of a transnational regime for the regulation of
fiduciary relationships between intermediaries and customers, the respective
provisions have changed their nature. While the understanding of fiduciary duties
and, indeed, their relevance for the solution of problems in the individual
contractual relationships differ considerably, especially between common and civil
law jurisdictions, the emerging body of principles and duties can nonetheless be
described as “functional fiduciary law”, i.e., legal solutions to economic problems
that arise in agency relationships irrespective of the respective underlying contract
law frameworks and their links towards more general principles (good faith, duties
of care, skill, and honesty) in the respective legal systems. In this sense, the
emergence of a universally accepted body of conduct-of-business standards
certainly can be characterized as a successful example for transnational legal
transplants.
Apart from the incentives of the regulated industry to accept and implement
such standards as a price for unrestricted access to foreign markets, two interrelated
aspects in particular appear to have facilitated this development:
First, regulatory law is, almost by definition, generic in nature and thus less
contingent on functional interlinkages with general principles of contract law, be
they rooted in common or statutory civil law.
Second, precisely because the inclusion of transaction-oriented conduct-ofbusiness standards originally served to compensate for weaknesses in the protection
of investors under general principles of fiduciary law, the applicable regulatory
standards were at the same time more focused on specific aspects of the
intermediary-customer relationships—and simpler to administer. Regulatory
conduct-of-business standards apply independently from general principles of
contract law. At the same time, they are not intended to provide a legal basis
addressing all aspects of the relevant relationships, but merely add to general
contract law by imposing certain protective duties and facilitating their ex ante
supervision by public authorities. This allows the implementation and enforcement
of regulatory requirements in a way that is functionally and operationally separate
from the application of general contract law, which in turn facilitates their “export”
to, and adaptation by, jurisdictions with different contract law regimes.
Against this backdrop, however, problems of coordination between the
regulatory sphere and the respective contract law environment are inevitable, and it

94.
See, e.g., GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 123–34 (2010).
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is hardly surprising that such problems can be identified as a common concern in
many jurisdictions, including the Member States of the European Union. Realigning
regulatory standards with the technical content of applicable contract law and,
indeed, general principles of contract law (including, for that matter, the common
law of agency and fiduciary duties) continues to be difficult especially in cases where
the substantive content diverges. In this respect, the on-going discussion on the
private law implications of the harmonized body of European conduct-of-business
regulations is just one illustrative showcase. As long as national differences in the
treatment, and resolution, of such conflicts continue to exist, the process of
“transnationalization” of what could be described as “functional fiduciary law”
clearly remains incomplete—with potentially significant results in terms of
substantive outcomes. Although the transnational convergence of regulatory
standards that can be described as “functional” fiduciary law has made enormous
progress over the past decades, the private law regimes applicable to the
intermediary-customer relationship continue to differ considerably. With the
relevance of international “soft law” instruments, transnational cooperation of
regulatory institutions acting under highly politicized mandates and corresponding
restrictions, and influenced by strong market forces, the emergence of transnational
standards for the regulation of financial intermediation thus reflects an on-going
process of transnational legal ordering but does not represent a mature transnational
legal order yet.

